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ABSTRACT
Earnings are the flow of value created by corporations. I concentrate on the concept called EBITDA
– earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. This measure captures the results
of the substantive non-financial activities of corporations and corresponds to the rental price of
capital multiplied by the quantity of capital. I measure earnings per dollar of capital for all U.S.
corporations and in 5 selected industries. I develop a competitive benchmark for the level of
earnings, which takes account of adjustment costs, taxes, depreciation, and the financial opportunity
cost of funds. I find that aggregate corporate earnings track the benchmark reasonably closely,
leaving a relatively small unexplained component. Thus evidence of the flow of value gives little
help in explaining the large discrepancies found in earlier work in the level of the market value of
claims on corporations relative to the replacement cost of the capital stock. At the industry level, I
find more volatility of both actual and benchmark earnings, with a high correlation between the two








Earnings are the flow of value accruing to a claimant. In standard corporate 
accounting, the claimant is the body of shareholders. The value of the claims of the 
shareholders—reflected in the corporation’s value in the stock market—is the present 
value of future shareholder earnings. Those earnings are the net flow after satisfying the 
claims of debt holders. In addition, as recent experience has shown, shareholder earnings 
are buffeted by changes in the value of the financial claims of the corporation on other 
businesses. Where the market values of those claims are in doubt, there is corresponding 
doubt about shareholder earnings.  
A great deal of business analysis of earnings cuts around most of these problems by 
adopting, implicitly, a different accounting framework. That framework considers all of the 
financial claims on a business rather than focusing just on the shareholders’ residual claim. 
In particular, the measure called EBITDA—earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, 
and amortization—is a popular measure of business performance. It isolates the 
substantive results of business activities from changes in the firm’s financial portfolio. The 
isolation cannot be completely successful. In particular, it is almost impossible in banks 
and other financial institutions whose business activities involve operating portfolios. In 
addition, borderline activities such as the sale of services or software to business partners 
often cannot be cleanly divided between operating and financial activities. Nonetheless, 
EBITDA is a useful measure. This paper is about the economics of EBITDA. 
The first step is to measure earnings at the level of all U.S. corporations. The 
National Income and Product Accounts are the natural starting point for this exercise. The 
NIPA concept of profit is the residual from the sale of goods and services less costs of 
current inputs—it excludes the portfolio flows that complicate shareholder earnings. To 
bring profit up to EBITDA, I add corporate interest payments, taxes, and depreciation   2
(NIPA profit makes no deductions for amortization). I state earnings as a ratio to the 
estimated reproduction cost of corporations’ tangible capital—plant, equipment, and 
inventories. Thus the earnings concept is earnings per dollar of tangible capital.  
The second step is to develop a competitive benchmark for earnings. In a 
competitive economy, tangible capital services are supplied perfectly elastically to a 
corporation at a flow price that depends on taxation, depreciation, and risk. That is, the 
corporation must cover the costs of taxes and depreciation and repay the suppliers of 
finance for bearing risk. With perfect competition, earnings will equal the supply price of 
capital services. My benchmark considers risk as it is measured in modern financial 
economics as a determinant of the average value of earnings. The benchmark also 
incorporates adjustment costs. In the presence of adjustment costs, earnings include 
scarcity rents when the capital stock is growing. The benchmark uses an estimate of the 
coefficient relating Tobin’s q to the growth of the capital stock to take these rents into 
account. 
The third step is to compare measured earnings with the benchmark. I find that the 
benchmark accounts for most of the movements of the actual ratio of earnings to the 
replacement cost of the capital stock. This finding contrasts with my earlier work, which 
found a large gap between the market value of corporations and the value of their 
measured capital. The two findings are not strictly contradictory, however, because 
measured earnings are affected in two ways by intangible capital, and the two effects could 
be largely offsetting. On the one hand, earnings include the flow of value that corporations 
enjoy from their stocks of intangibles. On the other hand, earnings deduct the current cost 
of forming new intangibles.    3
II. Measuring  Earnings 
The Data Appendix describes the calculations and sources more fully. The 
complete details of all the calculations in the paper are in a set of spreadsheets available 
from Stanford.edu/~rehall. 
The starting point for earnings is corporate profits before tax for domestic business 
of U.S. corporations. To this I add interest paid and capital consumption allowances. The 
result is the nominal flow of domestic corporate EBITDA. To calculate the value of 
corporate plant and equipment,  , K tt p K , I use data from the Fixed Assets Tables compiled 
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis in conjunction with the NIPA. This source reports the 
net value at current prices of corporate equipment, software, and structures. I have not 
found a source for the value of corporate inventories,  , Vt t p V . I take private business 
inventories from the NIPA and multiply by the ratio of corporate to total capital 
consumption allowances to estimate the corporate component of inventory value. 
I measure earnings as the residual of total revenue,  t Y , over payments to non-













Figure 1 shows the result of these calculations, stated as the ratio of earnings to tangible 
capital value. Annual earnings averaged about 16 percent of capital value over the period 
since 1948. They reached a maximum in the mid-1960s above 18 percent, declined to a 
trough of about 12 percent in the early 1980s, and have grown since then, through the last 
reported year, 2001 (because the earnings data are based on income tax records, they are 































Figure 1. Ratio of Corporate Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and 
Amortization to Value of Corporate Tangible Capital, 1947-2001 
III.  The Competitive Benchmark 
The competitive benchmark asks what level of earnings would just cover the cost 
of supplying capital services. More precisely, when earnings are at the benchmark level, 
the return to holding a unit of capital is worth, in present value, exactly the cost of 
acquiring the capital. This discussion covers much of the same ground as Hall and 
Jorgenson [1967]. The competitive benchmark is a relative of the rental or service price of 
capital, developed in the investment literature. For the moment, I will consider only one 
type of capital; later I will add inventories. I let  K r  be the expected earnings of a machine   5
and let  K p %  be the purchase price of that machine. I then write the competitive benchmark 




. Absent factors such as earnings of intangibles, the actual earnings 
ratio presented in the previous section would have the same expected value as the 
benchmark. 
The flow benchmark developed here is a close relative of the value benchmark 
considered in my earlier paper (Hall [2001]). The benchmark in the earlier paper for the 
total value of all financial claims on a corporation is the value of the capital stock held by 
the corporation. A direct arbitrage argument shows that the value of financial claims 
should equal the benchmark, as a corporation can issue claims and buy capital profitably if 
the claims are worth more than the capital, or an outsider can buy claims to obtain the 
underlying capital if the claims are worth less than the capital. The paper extended this 
principle to take account of adjustment costs. Consequently, my earlier paper did not 
examine the present value of earnings as a benchmark for corporate value. 
The flow benchmark turns out to be more complicated than the value benchmark 
because production takes time. The firm chooses factor inputs in one period and sells the 
resulting output in the next period. The decision takes into consideration the financial risk 
of the funds tied up in capital and inventories while production occurs. Where the value 
benchmark is a single number—the current replacement value of the capital stock—the 
flow benchmark is a random variable. The fundamental condition defining the flow 
benchmark is stochastic. 
A.  Derivation of the flow benchmark 
Under constant returns to scale, the value of a corporation per unit of capital is 
independent of its scale. Thus, without loss of generality, one can examine the value of a 
corporation that starts with one unit of capital in year t  and allows it to depreciate without 
replacement. At a depreciation rate δ , the firm will hold 1 δ −  units a year later, ()
2 1 δ −  
after two years, and so on. I take consumption goods as numeraire, so all prices are in real   6
terms. Let  , Kt r  be the earnings per dollar of capital value. Consider a firm that uses one 
unit of capital in year t, 1 δ −  in period t+1, and so on. For the moment, I abstract from 
complications involving taxation and adjustment costs. Then the value of the firm at the 
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where m is the stochastic pricing kernel—marginal utility in some general sense. Cochrane 
[2001] provides a thorough treatment of finance from this perspective. The present value 
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Consequently, any random variable,  , ˆKt r , satisfying 
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could serve as a benchmark. The second factor inside the expectation is the return ratio, 
, ˆ
Kt R , corresponding to the benchmark earnings variable. Thus the criterion for the 
benchmark takes the compact form,   7
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This property of return ratios is the bedrock principle of modern finance. It is useful to 
rewrite it as 
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I define the risk premium as 
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so 
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This equation states the implications of equation (3.4) in the form of a Capital Asset 
Pricing Model. Expected return is a positive function of risk.  
Equation (3.9) suggests two approaches to measuring the return to capital. One is to 
take the realized actual return over an appropriate period. The other is to measure the risk 
premium from the covariance of the realized return with an empirical stochastic discounter 
and apply the premium to the risk-free rate, according to the right-hand side of the 
equation. Economists who study securities markets have a strong preference for the second   8
procedure, because the variance of realized returns for equities is high. Consequently, 
measures of average returns are unreliable but measures of covariances are adequately 
reliable. As I will explain shortly, the variance of the returns to capital is nowhere near as 
high as the variance of the returns to equity, so I use the realized average,  K R . I will refer 
to this quantity as the financial cost of capital. 
With these ingredients, I can provide a characterization of the benchmark more 
operational than the general definition in equation (3.4). A benchmark return ratio is 
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Consequently, 
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I summarize in  
Flow Valuation Theorem: Under constant returns to scale and with a 
financial cost of capital  K R , among earnings distributions  , ˆKt r , those that 
satisfy the valuation condition of equation (3.1) have unconditional mean 
() 1 K R δπ −− .   9
The theorem provides a two-step process for checking an observed time series of 
earnings against the flow valuation criterion. First, determine the financial cost of capital, 
K R . Second, compare  , Kt r  to the benchmark mean,  () 1 K R δπ −− . Notice that the use of 
the realized average return to measure the financial cost of capital means that the 
comparison cannot show that the average of  , Kt r  departs from the benchmark. The two are 
equal by construction. Rather, the comparison shows if there are briefer episodes of 
earnings above or below the benchmark. 
B.  Returns with adjustment costs, taxation, and inventories 
I take account of adjustment costs by reinterpreting the price of capital goods,  K p . 
That price is the market price for newly produced capital goods in the absence of 
adjustment costs and is the internal shadow value of installed capital in the presence of 
adjustment costs. In the latter case,  K p is the purchase price,  K p % , multiplied by Tobin’s q 
(this is just the definition of q). I measure Tobin’s q from the first-order condition for 
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The evidence across the industries considered in Hall [2003] suggests that a typical value 
for γ  is about one, the value I adopt here. The results would be similar across a range of 
values consistent with that evidence and with other work on estimating adjustment costs 
from the Euler equation. 







 (3.13)   10
be the value share of fixed capital. The firm buys one dollar’s worth of capital at the 
beginning of the period, divided with weights  t ω  and 1 t ω −  between fixed capital and 
inventories. At the end of the period, the firm receives tax benefits (investment tax credit 






ω  from fixed capital 
and () , 1 tV t x ω −  from inventories. The division by  t q  reflects the fact that tax benefits for 
plant and equipment are awarded per dollar of acquisition cost, not per dollar of value. At 
the end of the period, the firm receives revenue of  t y , pays  t w  for its other inputs, and 
pays tax on the difference. Thus the firm’s after-tax earnings are () ( ) 1 ttt yw τ −−. For the 
remainder of the paper, I consider the case where depreciation varies over time but is 
determined by the date when capital is installed. Thus the remaining value of the fixed 
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ratio for the one dollar investment is: 
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 (3.14) 
The literature on measuring the return to capital—notably Poterba [1998]—has not always 
included the last two terms, representing capital gains on capital goods. The rate of return 
without those terms is the own rate on capital, rather than the real rate based on treating 
consumption goods as numeraire. As a practical matter, the difference is small, because the 
prices of capital and consumption goods generally move together.   11
C.  Measuring the return to investment 
The formulation in equation (3.14) clarifies the role of risk in the determination of 
earnings. Risk arises from uncertainty about earnings per unit of capital and about the price 
of capital goods next period. In the simplest case, where consumption goods are perfect 
substitutes for output and capital goods, there is no uncertainty about capital goods prices 
and the risk premium arises only from uncertainty about output per unit of capital. On the 
other hand, the price of fixed capital goods fluctuates in the presence of adjustment costs. 
The risk premium is likely to be positive in this case—favorable events raise the shadow 
value and lower marginal utility, so the covariance of the return with the pricing kernel is 
negative and the risk premium, φ , correspondingly positive. Similarly, if the adjustment 
costs are external, arising in the industries supplying capital goods,  , K t p is the observed 
price, which is likely to be negatively correlated with marginal utility, and again the risk 
premium is positive.  
The standard approach in modern finance is to measure the risk of a security’s 
return from equation (3.7) and then to apply equation (3.9) to infer its expected return—see 
Cochrane [2001]. The reasons are twofold: First, persuasive evidence shows that expected 
returns vary over time (Campbell and Shiller [1998]). Second, realized returns have high 
dispersion with thick tails, so that estimates of expected returns from the sample mean of 
historical returns have large sampling errors while estimates of covariances are adequately 
precise.  
I think the balance tips in the opposite direction for the return to corporate tangible 
capital. The dispersion of returns to capital is far less than for returns to the S&P 500. The 
standard deviation of the return to capital is 0.028 as against 0.150 for the S&P (return 
calculated from data from Robert Shiller’s website). The standard error of the estimated 
mean for the return to capital is 38 basis points as against 207 basis points for the S&P. To 
put the difference most dramatically, it would take 1559 years of data for the S&P to   12
measure its unconditional expected return with the same precision obtained here from 54 
years of data for the return to capital. 
The precision of estimation of the mean of the realized return to capital is sufficient 
to explore for variations over time. There is statistically unambiguous evidence of a 
slightly lower return in the second half of the sample period, from the mid-1970s onward. 
This was a period of rising real returns to debt, so a financial model such as the standard 
Capital Asset Pricing Model that portrays risky returns as the sum of a time-varying return 
to risk-free debt plus a constant risk premium would contradict the evidence from the mean 
of the realized return. 
The compelling reason to avoid an inference of the expected return from a risk 
premium and a risk-free return, as in equation (3.9), is that finance has yet to resolve 
fundamental puzzles about measuring the stochastic discounter in equation (3.7) in a way 
that rationalizes the pricing of securities. The stochastic discounter needs to have extreme 
volatility to rationalize the equity premium (Hansen and Jagannathan [1991]) but the 
marginal rate of substitution from any but the most exotic preferences falls far short of that 
volatility (Campbell and Cochrane [1999]). Without much guidance about how to 
construct the stochastic discounter in practice, I am thrown back on the simple calculation 
of the mean of the realized return. 
D.  Components of the benchmark 
The earnings shown in Figure 1 are earnings per dollar of capital valued at 
acquisition price. The corresponding benchmark stated in terms of the conditional 
expectation and  t q  is 
  () ( ) 1 tt t t t t qE y w ωω +− − . (3.15) 
From equation (3.14), the conditional expectation of the return to capital is   13
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For the reasons discussed earlier, I will approximate the conditional expected return by its 
unconditional value,  C R . I allow for time variation in the conditional expectation of 
revenue. In addition, as equation (3.16) indicates, the tax rate and the rate of depreciation 
vary over time. As a result, the earnings benchmark does vary over time, even though the 
return to capital is taken to be constant over time.  
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Thus the benchmark for earnings per dollar of capital measured at acquisition price is: 
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With zero weight for inventories ( 1 t ω = ), this equation is close to the discrete-time version 
of Hall and Jorgenson’s [1967] rental price of capital, but is not exactly the same because it 
is the expected value of the realized income, not the rent that would be set in advance in a 
competitive market for rental contracts. The latter would command a risk premium not   14
included here—specifically, the conditional expectation of the ratio of the future to the 
current capital goods price would be replaced by the conditional expectation of the product 
of the pricing kernel and the price ratio. 
The final step is to provide empirical counterparts to the conditional expectations of 


















+ . Although an 
econometric fishing expedition might turn up some variables with forecasting power, I 
believe that the most reasonable measures are the unconditional expectation,  K π =0.990 
and  V π =0.989 (both types of capital have become cheaper relative to consumption 
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The final step in the derivation of the benchmark is to relate the annual equivalents 
of tax benefits,  , K t x  and  , Vt x , to actual tax provisions. Under the U.S. corporate income 
tax, in some years corporations received, in effect, a negative excise tax on some fixed 
capital in the form of an investment tax credit. In all years, corporations were entitled to 
depreciation deductions based on lifetimes that have varied substantially over time.  
In principle, calculating the first-year equivalent of the investment tax credit and 
depreciation deductions is an intricate task, because the optimal pattern of ownership may 
involve tax-motivated transactions in each machine at various ages. Most of these are 
blocked by tax-benefit-recovery provisions in the law. I believe that a reasonable 
approximation can be based on a simple smoothing model. I calculate  , K t x  from the   15
hypothesis that the flow associated with a given machine,  () , 1
t
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present value equal to the present value of the actual tax credit and depreciation 
deductions. Let the latter be  t C  and  t D . Then 
  () ( )
1
, 11 K tB t t x RC D τ δπ −  =− − +  . (3.20) 
Here  1
B R
−  is the real discount ratio appropriate for the tax benefits, which have low 
financial risk. U.S. corporate tax law has always kept depreciation deductions constant in 
nominal terms, so the present value  t D  projects changes in real deductions associated with 
changes in the price level. Also, the value of depreciation deductions depends on the tax 
rate prevailing when the deductions are taken, so  t D  in principle involves expectations of 
future corporate tax rates, though these are probably little different from the rate prevailing 
at time t.  
For inventories, U.S. tax law provides no depreciation or other incentive, but does 
impose an implicit capital gains tax because of the tax rule that firms deduct the cost of 
inventories only when the goods are sold. Thus 
  () , 1 Vt t t xf τ =− − . (3.21) 
where  t f  is the rate of growth of the nominal inventory price. 
The rate of return from equation (3.14) averages 4.46 percent with a standard error 
of 0.38 percentage points. This corresponds reasonably closely to Poterba’s [1998] 
estimate of 5.1 percent. Poterba does not decompose total corporate taxes as in equation 
(3.14), but rather simply treats all taxes paid as a deduction from the return.   16
IV.  Comparison of Actual to Benchmark Earnings 
Figure 2 compares the actual earnings from Figure 1 with the benchmark of 
equation (3.19). The two agree reasonably closely. Of course, the agreement on overall 
level is by construction, as I chose the constant after-tax real return to capital to equal its 
average over this period. The benchmark captures the lack of trend in earnings through 
1972, some of the decline from then until 1982, and most of the increase since then. The 































Figure 2. Actual and Benchmark Earnings 
Figure 3 shows the contributions of five variables in the benchmark: the rate of 
depreciation,  t δ , the corporate tax rate,  t τ , Tobin’s  t q , the tax incentives  , Kt x  and  , Vt x ,   17
and the inventory mix,  t ω . The contribution is measured as the difference between the 
benchmark and a recalculation of the benchmark with the variable held constant at its 
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Figure 3. Components of Benchmark Earnings 
Depreciation rises on a steady trend. An important part of the rise in the benchmark 
and, presumably, in actual earnings after 1982 comes from higher depreciation rates. These 
reflect the shift in the composition of corporate capital away from plant and toward 
equipment, and, within equipment, toward shorter-lived computers. On the other hand, the 
corporate tax rate has generally contributed a component trending downward, with upward 
spikes in the Korean War and before the tax reform of 1986. Tobin’s q makes only 
transitory contributions to the benchmark. With relatively low adjustment costs, the   18
contributions are quite small. Tax incentives and the inventory mix make relatively small 
contributions. 
The aggregate data displayed in Figure 2 leave relatively little unexplained about 
earnings. In particular, there is little sign in the 1990s of any flow of earnings from 
intangibles or other factors that might explain the extraordinary level that the stock market 
reached during the 1990s. The contrast is striking between the small discrepancies 
separating actual and benchmark earnings in Figure 2, on the one hand, and the huge 
discrepancies separating the value of the stock market and other financial claims and its 
benchmark, the reproduction cost of the capital stock, in my earlier work on the stock 
market (Hall [2001]), on the other hand. 
The results in Figure 2 support my earlier findings of low adjustment costs. If the 
residuals between actual earnings and the benchmark arose from rents earned from high 
adjustment costs, the residuals would be persistent. The serial correlation of the residuals is 
0.62, far below the level that would correspond to high adjustment costs and completely 
consistent with the movements that would occur from random, transitory influences other 
than responses to adjustment costs. 
V. Industry  Earnings 
The NIPAs do not provide detail to carry out calculations for corporations at the 
industry level. I am limited to calculations for all forms of business. The NIPA accounting 
system does not separate the earnings of capital from the earnings of labor for non-
corporate entities, which are mainly proprietorships and partnerships. Logical methods for 
imputing earnings result in puzzlingly low returns to capital for non-corporate business—
see Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen [2002]. To avoid this problem, I limit the 
calculations to industries with small non-corporate sectors. The only measure that the 
NIPAs report for corporate and non-corporate businesses separately is capital consumption   19
allowances. Further, the NIPAs do not provide consistent detail for fine industry 
breakdowns. Two key variables, inventories and net interest, are available only at roughly 
the 1-digit SIC level. Table 1 shows the corporate fraction measured by capital 
consumption allowances for the finest industry detail for industries that are at least 90 
percent corporate. 
Industry  Percent 
corporate 
Manufacturing durables  97 
Manufacturing non-durables  98 
Communication 92 
Utilities 94 
Wholesale trade  94 
Table 1. Ratio of Corporate to Total Capital Consumption Allowances by Industry, 1987 
In these industries, I inflated corporate profits slightly to account for the fact that all 
other variables are measured at the total business level—I divided corporate profits by the 
counterpart of the percentage shown in Table 1, for each year. In all other respects, the 
calculations at the industry level are the same as those for total corporate business 
discussed earlier. 
Figure 4 compares actual earnings per dollar of capital to the benchmark for the 
five industries. In three of the industries—non-durables, communication, and utilities—the 
agreement of actual and benchmark is striking. The match is even closer than for total 
corporate earnings. In durables and wholesale trade, actual earnings were well above the 
benchmark in the 1950s, fell below in the 1980s, and then recovered toward the benchmark 

















































































































































































































































































































Figure 4. Actual and Benchmark Earnings per Dollar of Capital for Five Selected Industries   21
To investigate the nature of the departures of actual from benchmark earnings, I 

















Here L is the lag operator, ρ  is the serial correlation of the disturbance, and  t ε  is the 
innovation in the disturbance. Table 3 shows the results. 







Manufacturing durables  1.39  (0.47)  0.65  (0.08) 
Manufacturing non-durables  0.01  (0.55)  0.47  (0.21) 
Communication -0.64  (0.47)  0.85  (0.13) 
Utilities -1.04  (0.54)  0.75  (0.19) 
Wholesale trade  1.10  (0.44)  0.71  (0.04) 
Table 2. Regressions of the Ratio of Actual to Benchmark Earnings on q, with Autoregressive 
Error 
The unexplained component is positively correlated with Tobin’s q  in the two 
industries with large departures of actual from benchmark earnings, durables and 
wholesale trade. The coefficient of the regression on q is about 1.5. This correlation does 
not imply an understatement of the adjustment-cost coefficient, γ , that I used to form q. 
The value of γ  that resulted in zero correlation with the unexplained component would be 
a cousin of the least-squares estimate of γ  in the framework of Hall [2003]. Because there 
are good reasons to use the instrumental-variables estimate of γ , there is no reason to 
expect a zero correlation. Further, even if one did choose a higher adjustment cost, γ , in 
order to make q and the unexpected component of earnings uncorrelated, the resulting 
unexpected components would be quite similar to the ones shown in Figure 4. The figure   22
would look hardly different if the fluctuations in q were multiplied by two, because the 
volatility of q is so low (see Figure 3).  
I conclude that the movements of earnings not explained by the benchmark do not 
arise from rents associated with scarce capital, on the upside, or depressed earnings from 
capital surpluses, on the downside. The fluctuations associated with those rents can be 
identified by their correlation with the rate of growth of the capital stock, measured by q. 
Instead, the movements come from other sources. Some of the unexplained components 
are likely the results of problems in the data. The estimates of the serial correlation 
parameter are 0.65 or higher for all industries but non-durables. Thus the forces that cause 
the discrepancies are quite persistent—the role of surprises in earnings or in capital prices 
must be relatively small. 
Figure 4 shows noticeable differences in the level of earnings per dollar of capital 
across industries. These differences are reflected in the underlying rates of return, to the 
extent that differences in depreciation rates and other determinants do not account for 
them. Table 3 shows that the differences in rates of return are substantial. Some of the 
differences may result from variations in financial risk—manufacturing and wholesale 
trade may be riskier than communication and utilities, in the sense of having returns more 
negatively correlated with the stochastic discounter of equation (3.7). 
Industry  Rate of return (dollars per year 
per dollar of capital value)  
Manufacturing durables  8.0 
Manufacturing non-durables  11.7 
Communication 2.7 
Utilities 4.2 
Wholesale trade  7.2 
Table 3. Rates of Return to Capital by Industry, 1948-2001   23
VI.  Contribution of Earnings Discrepancies to Valuation 
Discrepancies 
The value of a corporation includes the present value of the earnings it enjoys in 
excess of the benchmark. Let  t d  be the discrepancy in year t between actual and 
benchmark earnings. If the risk of the discrepancy is the same as the risk of earnings in 
general, then the earnings discrepancy contributes 
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to the value of the corporation. If the discrepancy follows a univariate AR(1) process with 









% . (6.2) 
The AR coefficient ρ  has the value 0.62 for total corporate earnings. Higher-order AR 
processes contributed nothing meaningful to the fit. 
Figure 5 compares the present value of the earnings discrepancy,  t v % , to the 
discrepancy between the market value of claims on corporations and the estimated value of 
their tangible capital, from Hall [2001]. The latter is measured by imputing Tobin’s q for 
plant and equipment from equation (3.12) and dividing the resulting measure of plant and 
equipment value, together with the value of inventories, into the market value of corporate 
securities and other financial claims from my earlier work. Note that this measure is for 
non-financial corporations while my work in this paper on earnings is for all corporations. 
I have not found detailed data on financial claims for any sector that matches a sector for 
which I can carry out the NIPA-based earnings calculations. Figure 5 shows that the 
present value of the earnings discrepancy is tiny in comparison to the valuation   24
discrepancy. Further, the two are only slightly positively correlated, with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.22. I conclude that the small earnings discrepancies uncovered in this paper 



















Figure 5. Comparison of Valuation Discrepancy and Present Value of Earnings Discrepancy 
My earlier paper hypothesized that the valuation discrepancies arose from 
accumulation of intangibles. The finding that earnings discrepancies are not part of the 
explanation of the valuation discrepancy does not dispose of that hypothesis. When a 
corporation invests in intangibles, the amount of the investment is subtracted from earnings 
because it is treated as a current expense. Small earnings discrepancies may result from the 
offsetting effects of the earnings of intangibles—which are included in earnings—and the 
deduction of investment in intangibles. Let  t G  be the stock of intangibles and suppose, for 
simplicity, that the price of intangibles in consumption units is a constant, normalized at   25
one. Further assume that the risk of the earnings of intangibles is the same as the risk of 
earnings in general. Let the depreciation rate of intangibles be θ . Then the per-unit 
earnings of intangibles will be  1 C R θ +− , according to equation (3.11). The amount 
mistakenly deducted from earnings is  () 1 1 tt GG θ − −− , gross investment in intangibles. 
The condition for exact cancellation is  
  1 tC t GR G − = . (6.3) 
That is, smooth growth of the flow of investment and thus of the stock of intangibles at a 
rate equal to the cost of capital will result in zero discrepancy between actual reported 
earnings and the benchmark based on tangible capital alone. Intangibles will be invisible in 
earnings. 
The valuation discrepancy in Figure 5 does not follow a path of constant growth. 
Some other factor is at work. Consider the following possibility: Each period, the stock of 
intangibles rises or falls by a random amount  t g , unrelated to the formation of new 
intangibles. Assume that the present value of  t g  as of period t–1 is zero. From equation 
(3.3), one can see that  t g  will not appear in the earnings benchmark for intangibles. 
Further,  t g  does not have any effect on reported earnings. Consequently, the law of 
motion of the stock of intangibles that leaves no trace on recorded earnings is 
  1 tC t t GR G g − =+ . (6.4) 
Figure 6 shows the random increment to intangibles, calculated as  1 tC t GR G − −  and 
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Figure 6. Increments to Intangibles—Quarterly Changes at Annual Rates, as a Percent of 
Total Market Value 
These increments come very close to satisfying the condition of unpredictability—
not surprisingly, because they are close to being capital gains on securities, which are 
known to be essentially unpredictable. But the increments are large, sometimes exceeding 
100 percent at annual rates. The view that intangibles account for broad swings in 
corporate value, despite being invisible in corporate earnings, is at best at the borderline of 
credibility.   27
VII. Concluding  Remarks 
This paper on the flow of value created by corporations has close connections, both 
in approach and in conclusions, with my earlier paper (Hall [2001]) on the market values 
of corporations. Both use the same accounting framework, placing financial claims on one 
side and substantive business activities on the other side. Both take explicit account of 
rents from adjustment costs, either in the sense of flows of rents or the market values of 
those flows. But the two papers reach quite different substantive conclusions. Here I find 
that standard determinants of the flow of value—taxes, depreciation, and adjustment 
costs—account for most of the observed movements in the aggregate flow. In my earlier 
paper, I found large movements, not explained by adjustment costs, in market value per 
dollar of capital. I suggested that intangible capital is a potential explanation for the large 
discrepancy, though I noted that intangibles could not explain the negative discrepancy in 
the decade centered around 1980. The earnings of intangibles are not visible in recorded 
earnings, but that finding may be the result of cancellation of their earnings and the costs 
of forming the intangibles. It takes large random additions to and subtractions from the 
stock of intangibles to reconcile the high amplitude of variations in the stock market with 
the low amplitude of variations in earnings.   28
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Data Appendix 
Total corporate earnings for Figure 1. Corporate profits before tax and corporate 
interest from NIPA Table 1.15. Corporate capital consumption allowances from NIPA 
Table 6.22. Corporate earnings are the sum of the three components. 
Corporate capital for Figure 1. Corporate fixed capital from NIPA Fixed Asset 
Table (FAT) 4.1. Business inventories from NIPA Table 5.12. I approximate the corporate 
fraction as the ratio of corporate capital consumption allowances to corporate plus non-
corporate capital consumption allowances, NIPA Table 6.13. Total corporate capital is 
corporate fixed capital plus the approximate corporate share multiplied by total business 
inventories. 
Plant and equipment depreciation rate for Figure 2. Calculated as the ratio of 
corporate depreciation, FAT 4.4, to corporate fixed capital, FAT 4.1. 
Corporate tax rate for Figure 2. Calculated as the ratio of federal corporate income 
and excess profit taxes, IRS, NIPA Table 8.25, line 20, to total receipts less deductions, 
IRS, same table, line 1. 
Price index for plant and equipment, Figure 2. Calculated as the ratio of nominal 
corporate fixed capital, FAT 4.1, to the corresponding quantity index, FAT 4.2. 
Price index for inventories, Figure 2. From NIPA Table 7.16, implicit price 
deflators for private inventories. 
Price index for consumption, Figure 2. From NIPA Table 7.1, implicit price 
deflator for consumption. 
Tobin’s q, Figure 2. Calculated from equation (3.12), with plant and equipment 
stock from FAT 4.2; adjustment cost coefficient  1 γ = . 
6-month Treasury bill rate, Figure 2. 1947-1958, imputed as the commercial paper 
rate, from the Economic Report of the President, less 0.138 percent. 1959-2001, Economic 
Report of the President.   30
Investment tax credit, Figure 2. Ratio of dollar amount of credit, line 25, NIPA 
Table 8.25, to nominal business fixed investment, NIPA Table 1.1. 
Depreciation rate for corporate tax purposes, Figure 2. Inferred from IRS 
depreciation, NIPA Table 8.22, and investment in structures and equipment, NIPA Table 
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where r is the 6-month Treasury bill rate. 
x for plant and equipment, Figure 2. Calculated from equation (3.20), with real 
discount rate  1 1
1.03
B R π − = . 
x for inventories, Figure 2. Calculated from equation (3.21), with inventory price 
from NIPA Table 7.16. 
Weight for plant and equipment in total capital, ω , Figure 2. See sources for total 
corporate capital, Figure 1. 
Total and corporate capital consumption allowances, Table 1. Corporate from 
NIPA Table 6.22, non-corporate from NIPA Table 6.13. 
Value of plant and equipment, Figure 4. From FAT 3.1ES. 
Value of inventories, Figure 4. From NIPA Table 5.12. 
Corporate profits before tax, Figure 4. From NIPA Table 6.17 
Net interest, Figure 4. From NIPA Table 6.15. 
Corporate capital consumption allowances, Figure 4. From NIPA Table 6.22. 
Non-corporate capital consumption allowances, Figure 4. From NIPA Table 6.13. 
Depreciation, Figure 4. From FAT 3.4ES. 
Plant and equipment price, Figure 4. Nominal capital from FAT 3.7 divided by 
real capital, FAT 3.8. 
Inventories price, Figure 4. From NIPA Table 7.16.   31
Valuation discrepancy, Figure 5. From backup materials for Hall [2001], 
Stanford.edu/~rehall, total value of securities of the non-financial corporate sector divided 
by the sum of the calculated values of plant, equipment, and inventory, less one. 